It is important to note that Chávez ultimately obtained the presidency through a fair election. For a considerable period of time he did remain a popular leader. Authoritarians who are elected present a conundrum for liberals. Liberals support democracy but how must we deal with leaders who come to power through elections and then proceed to crush civil liberties?
Fareed Zakaria’s essay “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”1 (1997) makes a useful distinction between contested elections and civil liberties.
“for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy-a political system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property. In fact, this latter bundle of freedoms-what might be termed constitutional liberalism-is theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy.”
“Today, the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing, constitutional liberalism is not”.
The point he makes is that contested elections, even if free, do not necessarily guarantee the protection of civil liberties. What we observe now is that because of past intertwining of constitutional liberalism with democracy illiberal rulers are able to use elections to legitimise their rule.
In countries undergoing political or economic turmoil frustrated citizens may long for the restoration order. Anything may seem preferable to the chaos they confront. They perceive problems to be so difficult that only a strong ruler can effectively take charge and restore order. This leads to the election of the autocrat. The best example is that of Hitler.
Hayek recorded the popular sentiment at the time:
“‘We are living in economic chaos and we cannot get out of it except under some kind of dictatorial leadership”’1
And observed that:
“Hitler did not have to destroy democracy; he merely took advantage of the decay of democracy and at the critical moment obtained the support of many to whom, though they detested Hitler, he yet seemed the only man strong enough to get things done.”2
Similar forces, lead to the election of some of today’s autocrats. By 1998, Venezuela’s economy was in deep crisis. Per capita GDP was at the same level as 1963, down a third from its 1978 peak; the purchasing power of the average salary was a third of its 1978 level3. More than half the Venezuelan populace was below the poverty line, while annual inflation exceeded 30 percent. In 1999 the voters rejected the traditional political parties and elected Chávez as president on the basis of promises to rid the country of corruption, help the poor, and reduce the power of elites.
While old-style autocrats resorted to mass repression to control populations a new style of elected autocrat emerged in the late 20th century. Chavez of Venezuela is of this type. Other examples include Putin of Russia, Orban in Hungary and Erdoğan in Turkey. These new style autocrats have been termed “informational authoritarians [5]”
Guriev and Treisman argue that these new autocrats do not survive because of mass repression or ideology but through manipulating information to convince the public-rightly or wrongly that they are competent, meaning contributing positively to improving welfare. Provided the message is properly managed the public may believe this to be true, even if living standards fall, although too drastic a shock will break the spell.
1Zakaria, F., 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 1997, [Online]. 76, 6, p22. Available at: https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~lebelp/FZakariaIlliberalDemocracy1997.pdf [Accessed 6 December 2019].
2. Socialism and the Problems of Democratic Parliamentarism”, International Affairs, vol. XIII, p. 501., quoted by Hayek in the Road to Serfdom,1944, p71
3 Ibid, p.71
4. Kelly, Janet, and Palma, Pedro (2006), “The Syndrome of Economic Decline and the Quest for Change”, in McCoy, Jennifer and Myers, David (eds, 2006), The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela, Johns Hopkins University Press. p207
5. Guriev, S & Treisman, D. March 2016. How Modern Dictators Survive:An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism. [Online]. 1, 1. Available at: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/sem2016/development/guriev.pdf [Accessed 6 December 2019].
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